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On a clear spring day in 1963 a group consisting of three senior
members of the Soviet Presidium, President Kennedy with four of his
colleagues on the National Security Council, Charles de Gaulle, Fidel
Castro, and the U.N. Secretary General and his Military Advisor sat
down to an informal lunch together,, The Soviet group typically chose
the seats farthest from the others,. The Americans, characteristically
gregarious, nevertheless displayed a certain reserve toward General de
Gaulle and ostentatiously avoided Selior Castro, The Secretary General
seemed generally popular, The lIncheon conversation, while guarded,
was spirited as each group defended its strategy in the grave crisis
they all faced,
The place, however, was neither the White House, the Kremlin,
nor UN. Headquarters. It was Endicott House in Dedham, Massachusetts,
the "country estate" of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The "President of the United States," the "Chairman of the Soviet
Council of Ministers" and the other dignitaries were actually distin-
guished American diplomatic officials military officers, and schol-
arly specialists on foreign poiJcy. The enterprise was a three day
"political-military exercise," The subject was a hypothetical global
diplomatic crisis arising in Latin America, with senior American
professionals in the fields of diplomacy and strategy simulating the
roles of policy-makers in a number of "governments" including their
own. The main purpose was to learn something more about the kinds
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of strategies that might be open to the United States as it faces
political-military crises in the dangerous years ahead.
This undertaking was unusual but, although most Americans would
be surprised to know of it, not unique. For the same scene might be
encountered in a growing number of universities, research organiza-
tions, military and diplomatic training schools and, still in limited
ways, in policy-making centers in Washington itself.
Revolutions are few in the study and understanding of foreign
policy. Rarer still are techniques for methodically anticipating
events in the realm of diplomacy-a trade which, along with horse-
betting, traditionally relies on a highly unscientific combination
of hunch-playing plus an educated sense of the past. In recent years
the search has intensified for ways of bringing to foreign policy
planning some of the imaginative analytical techniques employed by
military planners and operations analysts. A variety of experimental
techniques has been developed with a view to increasing knowledge and
making it more precise. Beyond that is a far more daring claim: to
improve our ability to make predictions about the future. For to the
extent such new methods are successful they should tell us something
we do not now know about likely effects of national strategies and
the policies adopted to achieve them. They should help us make
better guesses about the probable reactions of other actors on the
international stage to American moves. And they should help us "stock-
pile" some useful conclusions about the options open to the nation as
it looks out across a seething world to the years directly ahead.
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Some of these attempts to make foreign policy "more scientific"
have been useful; some have not. Some seem promising, while others--
such as the attempts to reduce international relations to numbers--
too often seem to remove the very essence of the process, such elements
as temperament, history, and irrationality which constitute the real
world of international relations. Some of these new techniques have
impinged profoundly on the consciousness of policy makers; others
are as remote to them as Sanskrit, Diplomacy has by no means rushed
with open arms to welcome the invasion of its sacred precincts by
operations research or game theory. Most professional diplomats
persist in viewing their trade as an art--evanescent, fragile, and
not susceptible to scientific approach, And in many ways they are
right
So far there is no sign that such recent experiments have had
anything that could be cailed "success" according to classic defini-
tions. But some modest inroads have been riade on the problem. And
at least one device--the political-military exercise--has caught the
attention and imagination of people at responsible places in govern-
ment as well as in academic life, Indeed, there is some danger that
too much might be expected of it as an aid to policy planning and
action, since it remains highly experimental and only tentatively
capable of anything resembling predictive value,, Furthermore, it
may or may not be worth the cost and effort compared with more con-
ventional forms of research and planning. But as an interesting
intellectual innovation it has seemed worth investigating, and the
recent results of such investigation at one university--M.I.T.--are
reported here.
In 1958, two parallel interests converged to persuade the M.I.T.
Center for International Studies to give serious attention to politi-
cal gaming. Interest by Max Millikan and his colleagues at the
Center in simulation as a social science method had been whetted by
the role-playing, political gaming technique developed in 1954-56
in the RAND Corporation's Social Science Division. At the same time
the Center's United Nations project directed by the senior author
was seeking for better ways to anticipate and study future crises
involving the United States and the United Nations. And also at
M.I.T. Lucian Pye and others were beginning to experiment with simu-
lation as a classroom'device for teaching undergraduates.
The initial M.I.T. policy-type exercise--the so-called "POLEX"--
was held in the fall of 1958 as a part of the U.N. project, taking
as its mise en scene a hypothetical future crisis situation in Poland.
In 1959 two further games--but using undergraduates as players--were
conducted by Norman Padelford; and the use of simulation in the
teaching of foreign policy, strategy, and international relations to
lSocial Science Division, Experimental Research on Political
Gaming (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 10 November 1958.
Published as Memorandum P-1540-RC.)
both undergraduates and graduate students has been continued to the
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present by Professors Bloomfield and Padelford, The second Center
experiment employing senior specialists in and out of government was
held in 1960, also directed by the senior author and focused on a
crisis in the Middle East 3 This game was noteworthy both for demon-
strating the feasibility of incorporating a substantial element of
simulated theater-level military operations in an international
political crisis, and for developing the general technique to a point
where the professional participants recognized it as having heuristic
value even for themselves,
The most recent series comprised four games conducted under
contract with the Institute for Defense Analyses, in 1962-63. These
games combined several research and policy planning objectives. They
I and the two student games of 1959 are described in
Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Norman J. Padelford, "Three Experiments in
Political Gaming," American Political Science Review, v-53, no.4
(December 1959), pp 1105-15, and Lincoln P. Bloomfield "Political
Gaming," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vc8 6 , no.9
(September 1J), pp 573
Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The Political Exercise: A Progress
Report (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, M.ILT.,
March 1961, 24 pp., multilithed).
4Specifical'ly intended to supplement research undertaken by
IDA's Study DAIS (Domestic and International Security) supervised by
Ernest W. Lefever and under the general direction of James E. King, Jr.,
Director of the Division of International Studies at IDA. Study DAIS,
sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, was an investigation of the problems
involved in possible uses of international military force or forces.
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studied the possible employment of United Nations military forces
under conditions of increasing disarmament. They studied some of the
strains to which the disarmament process itself might be subjected by
major international crises. They studied crisis management per se,
each of the four hypothetical crises being chosen to represent a type
of crisis and a regional problem which was thought to be of potential
concern to U.S. policy makers.
The first game in this latest series (labelled for convenience
"POLEX-DAIS") was set in the present arms environment and involved a
typically ambiguous situation of Chinese Communist indirect aggres-
sion and subversion in Southeast Asia. The second was set at mid-
point of Stage I of a disarming world and concerned a colonial-racial
civil war in a newly independent African nation. The third simulated
a "classic" small-power war in the Near East under conditions midway
through a Stage II disarming world, and the fourth a Castro-type
revolution in Latin America in mid-Stage III, the stages being those
in the U.S. disarmament proposals of 18 April 1962.
The technique and findings reported in this paper draw upon the
entire series of exercises held at the M.I.T. Center since 1958, but
particularly the four "DAIS" games conducted during 1962-63. The
latter form a series, closely related not merely by the common commit-
ment to researching critical policy issues but also in that they
constitute a developmental sequence, each successive game having under-
gone appropriate modifications in structural format and procedural
rules. Before indicating the tentative conclusions drawn from these
games it might be helpful to describe briefly the art of the policy-
level political-military game as now practiced at M.IT. A later
section discusses briefly the possibly equally important and interest-
ing educative uses of the technique.
II. The Policy-T pe Political-Military Exercise
This type of politica.l-military exercise is a decision-making
simulation centering on a hypothetical (or real) international
political--and potentially military--crisis, and is characterized by
role-playing, with the senior policy echelons of governments or inter-
national organizations simtlated by professionally qualified political,
military and academic specialists, preferably men with either decision-
making experience at higher levels of government or close working
relations with policy makers,
Its chief purposes can be suimmed up as, first, the checking
out of hypotheses or tentative conclusions about foreign policy and
strategy arrived at by more conventional methods of research; second,
the "pre-testing" of strategies of action; thirdly,the discovery of
unanticipated contingencies, alternatives, or possible outcomes as a
consequence of sequential interaction between conflicting strategies
We propose that the term "exercise" be applied as the formal
rubric for this specific category of political or political-military
simulation. For informal or casual usage we have used the terms
"game, " "gaming," and "simulat ion,"
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in the simulation; fourthly, the close examination of one particu-
lar line of action that in its development and impact illustrates
vividly what a single plausible outcome might resemble in detail.
The political-military exercise falls into the broad category
of political simulations defined by Richard Brody as "physical and/or
biological representations of systems which attempt to replicate
sociopolitical processes." More specifically, they are in the sub-
category of "man"-simulations--as contrasted with "machine" or "man-
machine" simulations--although the technique does not logically
preclude introduction of computer-determined outcomes for certain
activities, particularly military ones.5
This kind of simulation is related only indirectly to the
theory of games, which applies mathematical formulas, laws of proba-
bility and bargaining theories to determine outcomes of formalized
conflict situations. The political exercise has parental roots in the
classic military war game, but does not usually lend itself to the
precise and numerically expressed wins and losses of a war game.
5For the theory and taxonomy of political simulations see Richard
A. Brody, "Varieties of Simulations in International Relations Research,"
in Harold Guetzkow, et al, Simulation in International Relations (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp.190-223. For the
theoretical limitations of "simulations" as contrasted with both
"operational gaming" and "analytic game theory" see Clayton J. Thomas
and Walter L. Deemer, Jr., "The Role of Operational Gaming in Opera-
tions Research," Operations Research, v.5, no.1 (February 1957), pp.1-27.
Actually, clear-cut "victories" are few in diplomacy, and one virtue
of the political exercise is to overcome myths to the contrary.
How is a game organized?
The participants inr the Center's g'mes have been divided among
two or more teams plus a Control Group. In addition to Control, the
series of games conducted by MiT. in 1962-63 employed from three to
five teams, the 1960 exercise used a standard "Red" versus "Blue"
team division, and in 1958 ten teams played simultaneously, In all
games played to date there Las been at a minimum a U.S. and a Soviet
team. (Some of the War College and Defense Department exercises
regularly limit themselves to "Red" and "Blue," in the possibly too
simple fashion of "aggressor" and "defender" in military war games.)
Each of the four POLEX-DAIS games also included a "UoN Team" rep-
resenting the quasi-autonomous role of the UNN Secretary-General and
his Military Advisor. Several games incorporated additional teams
representing China or the U.A R- or such collectivities as Western
Europe or the Afro-Asian bloc -
The Control GCroup has several functions. It represents "Nature,"
introducing unexpected events; it is umpire, ruling on the plausibil-
ity and outcomes of moves; it is, as it were, "God," requiring the
players to live with the implications of their chosen strategies.
Since only a fraction of the political world can be represented by
playing teams, the Control Group custorarily itself furnishes the
needed inputs on behalf of any other nations or international organi-
zations whose actions may be relevant to the crisis problem or to whom
the teams may be sending messages. If and when matters come to the
"U.N." and a decision point is reached, the Control Group, in collab-
oration with the U.N. team, can count probable votes and stipulate
the action taken.
Such games have employed from 18 to 24 full playing partici-
pants not counting the Game Director and Game Historian. This number
has now stabilized to be a close function of the number of teams, 3 to
5 members per team probably representing the limits for efficient
operation. Fewer than three members risks two-man conflict while
also not allowing enough manpower for the necessary production of
messages; more than five may produce near-paralysis in the team. The
POLEX-DAIS series employed from two to six-man teams, and its Control
Groups ranged in size from 5 to 9 men, with a single chairman (the
1958 and 1960 games having experimented with twin umpires supported
by "consultants"). Five seems the optimum number for Control,
although the number here is more flexible than on the teams. With
increased experience in game administration, we believe that by better
controlling the message flow the technique can cope effectively with
at least five teams, the main limiting factors being finance and
physical facilities rather than increased complexity of communications.
Each team and the Control Group is assigned members by the Game
Director on the basis of his anticipation of their needs for various
specialized skills. The Game Director also appoints one of these as
Chairman who is then expected to assign further roles or responsi-
bilities within his group. Because of their interactions it often
follows that "games" take place within the teams in making their own
collective decisions, The Grame Historian serves the Control Group as
its rapporteur, maintains the game archives and subsequently writes
the narrative history of the game. Each team is assigned a Rapporteur
who records, as an id to the astorian, the alternative strategies
considered by the teams. In addition the Rapporteurs may be coopted
by the senior members to perform playing roles on the teams. Team
Rapporteurs and the Game Historian may of course be drawn from among
the less professionaI.y exp-rienced, such as junior faculty members,
research assistants, or even older graduate students. Area, military,
or other experts who may be required may also be persons with little
actual decision-making experience
The physical arran ements for these games can (and do) range from
austere to luxurious. But it is essential to insure privacy of team
discussions by assigning each team to a separate room. The Control
Group requires sufficient spac to h both plenary meetings and the
Message Center,
Adequate administrative staff consists of the Game Director, an
Administrative Assistant, two Message Center Clerks (usually graduate
students or comparable personnel), a duplicating machine operator,
and one secretary-typist for each team Although this is a rather
large administrative lic OEx-DPI III with five teams plus
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Control had an overhead staff of 11-4-t has helped minimize intrusive
procedural incidents and has ensured prompt handling of messages.
In future games, the Game Director could probable double as Control
Chairman, but otherwise little modification in the administrative
roster seems indicated.
It has been found desirable to 'enforce a rule barring observers
or visitors; by all available evidence this kind of voyeurism, however
well-intentioned, is inhibiting and even disruptive. Similarly,
such standard laboratory or intelligence data-acquisition devices as
one-way mirrors, "bugs," "confederates," and even tape recorders have
seemed inadvisable.
The control of communications is essential to the exercise. All
moves of whatever sort, whether diplomatic messages, public speeches,
troop movements, or "secret" strategic plans, are initiated as Game
Documents on standard printed message forms and channelled by the
Message Center to, through, or from Control. Any informal face-to-
face negotiations or discussions between delegated members ofiteams--
a practice whose value in policy-games is questionable--are monitored
by Control and subsequently summarized as standard Game Documents.
It has proved possible to reduce the length of the typical M.I.T.
exercise from three-and-a-half to two-and-a-half days without loss
of quality and making it more convenient for busy persons to take
part. Increasing interest is being expressed in developing a one-day
exercise that with only a minimum of detailed planning and overhead
13
could on short notice be focused on an impending crisis situation.
A recent experience with a one-day game in the senior author's grad-
6 +uate seminar on foreign policy in the late spring of 1963 suggests
the feasibility of one-day games and it is our intention to experi-
ment with them further-
Given this setting and structure, how is a game played? First,
the substantive event with which the players must deal is set forth
in a basic document, the "scenario-problem," which specifies such
details as prior history and military capabilities and dispositions.
But unlike formal or highly structured political, military, and
business games, the poliical-military exercise does not proceed
beyond that point according to any predetermined program or script.
During the course of play the moves and counter-moves are improvised
A report by one of the seminar participants analyzes this game.
Tom W. Carroll, A Political-Miitary Game Involving an Independent
European Force (typerijpt, 2i,May 9. This game explored the
deterrence effect of a hypothetical independent European nuclear force.
7For a still excellent compression of the history, technique and
theory of political games, see Herbert Goidhamer and Hans Speier,
"Some Observations on Political Gaming," World Politics, vc12, no.1
(October 1959), pp 71-83. For a, highly critical evaluation of the
reality games" see Bernard C. Cohen, "Political Gaming in the Class-
room," Journal of Poitics, v. 24, no 2 (May 1962), pp-367-381. For
an informal discussion of the definitions, utilities, and limita-
tions of the various forms of political-military gaming see Ithiel
de Sola Pool, "Cold Was Modeling, Proceedings of the Military Opera-
tions Research Symposia (NOPS), v 1, no 1 Fall 191, 1Tpp. For a
recent survey of the more theoretical models, see Th9mas C. Schelling,
"War ithout Pain, and Other Model.s," World Politics, v.15, no.3
(April 1963), pp.46 5-487,
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by the teams. Even the Control Group is not constrained by a fixed
program, although it has in mind that the game tends to work best if
certain lines of action are stressed, e.g. it may be desirable that
the teams be deliberately pushed toward the "brink," or that the U.N.'s
capabilities be detailed as of special interest to examine. But
generally Control will limit itself to meshing the moves of the play-
ing teams in such a way as to keep them focused on the central
research problems posed for the exercise,
Play proceeds through a series of discontinuous "move periods"
which have ranged from four to six in number, the precise number
subject to change by Control in the light of developing. events.
(In the 1958 game and others we have heard about, play was continuous
except for time-out for meals, etc. Those of us who barely survived
the chaos of the 1958 exercise are grateful to Thomas C. Schelling
for suggesting the discontinuous move period device, not to mention
the many other ideas of value he has proposed as a close collaborator
in this area of research.)
Each move cycle begins with Control inputs, the scenario count-
ing as the initial Control move. In each move period the teams go
through a l to 3 hour process of defining and redefining their basic
strategies, assessing the motives underlying the moves of other
teams, the events necessary to foresee, and the courses of action
which might subsequently open, and then determining their moves in
relation to those alternatives. At the end of their allotted time,
while individual team members are engaged in drafting portions of
their collective o utput, it has been found extremely useful to have
each team chairman orally brief Control so its work can comence with-
out waiting for the detailed papers,
The relationship of "game time" to actual time is determined by
Control after considering the plausible time-lags required to accomo-
date the events generated by the teams, The time clock, that is to
say, is adjustable, each move period reflecting whatever time period
Control may stipa The OIEX-DATS gam es have simulated from 9
to 70 days of clock time, depinding on the level of intensity of the
crisis at the time it was presersted to the players, the complexity
of diplomatic negotiations inv'olved in formulating responses to the
crisis., the speed with which escalation may have developed, and so on
A fairly lengthy, lighly informal interaction process of this
sort is bound to generat a rathr astonishin number of events,
Of the many possible methoc by hic suc data can be collected and
analyzed, five were used throughout the DAIS series.
First, the standard Message Forms on which all final team
decisions and formal team interactions were recorded comprised the
basic record of the game, providing the raw material for the Game
8There are a variety of thertic and procedural problems
linked both to the use of discontinuous move periods and to the lack
of coincidence between. gane and real time, These problems have not




Summary prepared for each game by the Game Historian, and remaining
as promising data to be refined at leisure.
Second, the team Rapporteurs, being in a sense observers as
well as participants, recorded data about team consideration of
choices, strategies opted for and the like. (Their dual role has
tended to prevent the systematic collection of data on, e.g., intra-
team activities, but this should be readily solvable.)
Third, the discussions of the post-game Plenary Critique Session--
a general debriefing for all participants--were recorded by a court
stenographer. A full account of this material is thus available,
and represents a potentially fruitful vein to mine further. (In
future the Critique agenda can be more carefully prepared with a view
to probing for particular answers to questions that can best be dealt
with at that psychologically crucial. stage.)
Fourth, following the game each participant was given a Ques-
tionnaire to be completed at his leisure. Of these 88% have been
returned and provide a valuable basis for analysis of both the partici-
pants' reactions and their suggestions for improvements in the tech-
nique.
Finally, a single analyst has fruitfully explored the "tree"
of decision-making which the game comes in the end to resemble. Basing
himself mainly on the Game Documents, W, Edward Cushen of Case Insti-
tute prepared for the DAIS project a systems analysis of the individ-
ual games, as well as an overall assessment based on the choice-points
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identified and the alternatives discarded. This promising technique
merits refinement in future games,,
A special word is in order about the introduction in 1960 of
the military capability to what had been essentially a civilian
exercise,. One limitation- -among many--on purely political gaming had
been the need to keep the chosen crisis within the realm of diplomacy,
since the outbreak of "war" would end the game (whatever its other
unpleasant consequences). Manpower and planning tended to be
focused either on a diplomatic crisis situation--the typical game
played in the universities--or on a military hostilities situation--
the game emphasized by military reserchers and the arme ervices,
But the political analysts washed for some -manageable way to deal with
the outbreak of hostilities without terminating the game, and some
of the service schools felt that the "scenarios" vith which their
limited war games started were politi cally inade.quate,
It has been found extremely helpful to assign a professional
military officer as advisor to each team and to Control as well. Each
has the function of providiig, in rough, the kind of military advice
each side would be likeiy to get in the real-life situation. In
addition, if the game runs into a combat situation they are prepared
to sit down together and make a reasonably quick estimate of the military
situation on D plus 1, D plus 3, etc , without requiring complete
intelligence estimates, detailed order of battle information, and. so
on. In this way, if the developing logic of the situation being
simulated leads one or the other side to commit military forces,
the process of political decision and diplomacy can (ake account of
military developments as in an actual situation. The new situation
is redefined in military terms, enabling the play ers to proceed to
new political decisions.
III Implications for Policy
The questions raised by the use of gaming for serious policy
purposes are almost self-in Can Americans, howeer knowledge-
able, really simulate the actions and reactions of people bred and
trained in wholly different cultires or steeped in hostile ideology?
Can reality ever be reproduced or even approximated under laboratory
conditions, however skillfully attempted? Does what happens in a game
bear any provable relationahip to what will happen in real life?
The answers to these questions vary. The first one, on the
evidence, can be answered with a qualified affirmative (but it would
be obviously fascinating to run a game with real Soviet officials
simulating the reactions of the U.S.S.R. to some potential crisis!)
The answer to the second question is that of course reality can
never be reproduced exactly. But in gaming, as in any intellectual
undertaking, reality is represented by a model that reduces to manage-
able proportions the naturally infinite nunber of variables. The
relevant question is whether this particu.lar model teaches one things
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that other models of reality--whether pieces of paper, discussions,
or single-minded cerebration--do not, Our impression is that on
some issues--but not on all--it looks to come closer to "reality"
than other methods.
As to the third question, there is no way to connect up the
events of the game with the future until the future reveals itself.
The interesting point here, however, is that within this obvious limit
the game may illuminate better than other methods some possibilities
regarding the future that have not been examined, in such depth before,
For example, in some situations involvi.g major policy choices the
alternatives are not really infinite, they might even be limited to
"yes" or "no," In such cases much can be learned about the factors
that enter into those two choices anrd about the kinds of reactions
that might be expected on the part of allies and opponents, Congress
and public opinion, State Department and military services, intelli-
gence commuinity and scientific advisor
Beyond this, an exercise can supply useful information about
policy alternatives that have not hitherto been tested, by exposing
those options to simulated reactions and thus eliciting some of their
potential effects Another particular value derives from studying
the choice-points that arise to confront the policy maker in the life
of a given strategy, and the possible consequences to be expected
from each "branch," developing one or more to their logical. conclusion
As Ithiel de Sola Pool has put it, the game does not create new
knowledge of the world, but i a uq wa to put exist-
ing knowledge to work. Above al" into condtiRn-
gent planning. If conve~ntionali rsri and la; ing hve always
sought to do this job they carmot doJ b i pris iy is way, and
gaming is thus a useful adjunct t o
Role-playinig shoul: d n-ot bemsnes das2 reurigfihu
emulation of the policy-makit ye
under given constraints. YF thue
this form of role-playing mjay be mo
type game each team is usuall;y iis
wishes to follow, ithin th l
"optimal" strategy which a.s n ri
tegies of their assigned countr V
strategy does not, however, re
evolve a strategy whih ai
vital national, or ideological i
specified that the Soviet teams wo.
strategy, duplicating as best it
policy makers to analogous situa- m
teams were free to be as imagi
ular images of likely reponse b
ofa glre statesan or poli tician
ching urpos sosussed later,
instucti ve But in the pol.icy-
c coos th bradstrategy it
nd to actual past stra-
o oaot an "optimal",
he tefro the requilremenlt to)
-2h cnstraints imposed by
c alier gam~es it was
rpf cuarrent Soviet
2 I rthe DAIS, gamaes thei U.S
sde ired, unconfined by part ic-
o, pas perfomsance by known
political figures.
lt might be mentioian.d, pm: i ,, that Y L T 's games,
while mounted so far in icnnecio iOh a Gover ment-sponsored
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research studies, have been unclassified. At the same time we felt
it essential to protect the privacy of the participants, parti cularly
those occupying important positions in the Government, who ought under
no circunstances to be identified publicly with either the roles they
played or the outcome of particular games; nothing could more quickly
put an end to this promising area of collaboration than a sensational
and invariably misleading news story that puts two and two together
and in this case gets five. The specific country or region chosen
as the site of a hypothetical crisis has in some cases also not been
deemed a useful topic for public discussion becauase of the possibility
that such an exercise might be misconstrued as acti.al contingency
planning.
But it is possible to suggest the types of policy inferences one
can derive from a series of games, inferences which may well represent
the "sharpened perceptions" referred to above, strikingly brought into
focus and underscored by the game experience. Five examples from an
analysis by Bloomfield of the POLEX-DAIS series are iliustrative; the
conclusions are of course entirely his own:
In general, it appeared that an international, military
force (IMF) can be helpful to both U.S. and general peace-
keeping interests in the present world; in Stage I of General
and Complete Disarmament (GCD) an IMF appears somewhat more
indispensable than at present; in Stage II it verges on being
indispensable if the action is a considerable distance from
the U.S. power base, The games8 investigation of altered
U.S. strategic "reach" in a disarming world indicated that
while U.S. naval and sea power can still be projected with
relative ease through Stage I, in Stage II it pinches. In
the Stage III game U.S. residual power appeared adequate to
deal with a single hemispheric crisis but U.S. relations
with "client" states elsewhere would certainl have to alter
radically, and international military and politia action
substitute for it,, On balance, Stage II looked more attrac-
tive than Stage III in terms of a responsible U.S. capacity
to act, even iarginally. U.S. disariament plaxning might
well consider whether an appropriate plateau for the GOD
process can be found somewhere in Stage 11, and how to
structure the GCD process so that terminal points can be
established in equilibrium without endangering the entire
process.
The games demonstrated that if internat ional forces are
going to be used for such politically delicate operations
as racial war in Central and Southern Africa one quickly runs
out of neutral countries or forces of the right national
complexion (which may argue for reconsidering the desirabil-
ity of an internationally recrijted police iit). The
African game (like the real-life Congo) emphasized the
Secretary General's probiems of internal authority, specifi-
cally his ability to discipline units which become ideo-
logically committed to one side or the other in a civil war
situation. It also suggested to some the desirabilty of
looking again at a regionalizati(on of peace-keeping arrange-
ments in order to avoid some of the comp.li cat ions of policy
escalation, as it were, in a highly complex internal situation.
In the games there was less concern for escalation than
today, The Soviet teams in the advanced stages of disaria-
ment reported that they felt less constrained, thanks to the
absence of American forces in Europe and the general diminu-
tion of strategic power. :But the several USO teams estimated
that they were not particularly disadvantaged by a disarma-
ment agreement as they viewed their strategic options; their
view suggested that a new equAiibrium. bad been established
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in the world by GCD, embodying a system which was possibly
less dangerous than that of the past.
The policies of 'small countries' in the games suggested
that there may develop a highly emotional opposition to
General and Complete Disarmament which perhaps has not been
thought through by American policy makers. States such as
Israel, Turkey, etc., which will be drastically affected
vis-a-vis their neighbors may turn out to be bitterly opposed
to the point of having to have GCD literally forced upon
them if it ever comes about.
One of the major surprises was the unexpectedly active
coalition that developed between the Chinese and the Russians.
This was a consequence of the absence of overriding Soviet
interests in a region where there was no real need for Soviet
military assistance in order for the Chinese to be able to
proceed. The possibly temporary harmony of interests was
also due to Soviet ability in the game to be helpful to the
Chinese at the U.N. But the Soviet team was quite clear that
coordinated policy in this crisis was possible only to the
extent that the Chinese acted cautiously in recognition of
the dangers inherent in a Sino-US. confrontation, and hoped
the Chinese would thenceforth be less critical of the essen-
tial Soviet policy of conflict-avoidance.
IV. The Educative Uses of the Policy-Type Exercise
So far the discussion has concentrated on the professional use
of this technique for policy research. But the teaching and training
possibilities of this method may actually outweigh its obviously
moot "predictive values,."
One highly promising use is to teach students of international
relations and foreign policy more about the process of making and
executing foreign policy than they can learn from books or lectures.
At its best, it brings more formal learning material into extra-
ordinarily sharp relief. Colleges and universities such as M.I.T.,
Columbia, West Point, the Air Force Academy, and others have in recent
years used political games in both undergraduate and graduate courses,
with considerable success.
Another use of potential value is to help train military and
diplomatic officers at a more senior level, by having them act out the
stresses and strains typical of real-life crisis diplomacy, the deci-
sions made under pressures of time and events, the unexpected over-
turn of established plans, the necessity for evaluating a multitude of
factors and of having available alternative courses of action.
Gaming here is intended to highlight the complex of factors, subtle
and otherwise, that weigh in on the policy man, but which are not
always apparent in the neat strategic plan, the routine policy paper,
or the self-assured theory. It is hard to think of a better short-run
device for the field grade military officer who with increasing rank
will face growing involvement in diplomatic situations, an involve-
ment for which his academy training, his years with the troops or the
fleet, his correspondence courses, and his professional readings have
inadequately prepared him. In an attempt to fill this serious gap
some American service war colleges, through which the officers
eligible for high command pass, have begun to look, at gaming with a
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primarily political emphasis as a way of making better use of limited
training time on this range of issues.
The diplomatic trainee can also benefit from practice runs, so
to speak, through a variety of crises involving global or regional or
individual country situations for which he might one day have policy
responsibility. Some persons responsible for such training have
registered growing interest in experiments along these lines.
But the senior policy-type game itself, not designed as a
training device, has proven to have educational value, even raising the
question of whether this, rather than anything else, may not actually
be the principal "payoff", If so, one may legitimately ask whether it
justifies the effort involved. For wholly apart from the policy
lessons, the participants' questionnaires reveal that a uniformly
high value was set on the special benefits the games provide to
responsible officials and, to a slightly lesser extent, scholars, in
their real-life roles, particularly in sharpening professional
perceptions about the sorts of alternatives that could arise about a
region or a family of crises which a particular game epitomized.
The responses of military officers was, interestingly, the highest in
this respect. Many among the latter have commented that this
variety is uniquely useful to train senior officers in the sophistica-
tion of modern crisis diplomacy, with its richness of non-military
as well as military factors.
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Leading specialists on Soviet policy have come out of an M.I.T.
game with strikingly fresh ideas about their specialty, including such
things as an early awareness of the detailed constraints imposed on
Soviet policy-making by the conmunist alliance system, and the condi-
tions under which a Sino-Soviet rapprochement might surprisingly take
place. Senior American policy-makers who have taken part in simula-
tion exercises have been struck by the extraordinary difficulty
encountered in communicating seriously meant intentions to one's
opponents in a fully convincing way. This difficulty arose under
"laboratory conditions," but it mirrored some comparable problems in
real-life diplomacy.
In fact, the only sure value of the political-military exercise
may be the not inconsiderable one of providing not only students but
responsible scholars or policy-makers as well with one or more crucial
lessons not learned before, indelibly recorded in an important personal
experience.
V. Some Problems for Future Research in Gaming
A number of problems for further research on the application of
gaming to foreign policy problems have emerged from our discussion
of past experience; others are equally worthy candidates for study. We
plan to undertake a modest program of further political-military gaming
during 1963-4, combining a substantive focus on problems of deterrence
with an equally compelling research objective of consolidating and mak-
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ing more explicit and systematic the theoretical aspects of this gaming
technique. Some of the more interesting problems for gaming method and
theory that belong in such a research agenda are discussed below.
Nearly all participants remark the highly "realistic" nature of
the exercises, but as noted earlier these games represent a consider-
able abstraction from reality. Further work is required to identify
more specifically the sources of this sense of "realism." Experimenta-
tion has shown that it does not depend on such "atmospherics" as
surrounding players with such appropriate national symbols as flags
or pictures of Lenin; play can occur in bare rooms containing only the
essential reference and writing materials.
What are the effects on realistic simulation of the degree of
participants' involvement in an assigned role, their conscientious
professional interest in the subject matter of the game, or their en-
joyment of a game for its own sake? These three modes of involvement
should be investigated to determine if they lead to decisions which
occur in games but not in actual political-military crises. Thus, the
man who cannot become absorbed by the assigned role may easily produce
responses inappropriate to that role; the man who remains uninvolved
in the subject matter may lack ipsentive to consider the full range of
alternatives, and the man who plays only the game itself may be tempted
to accept higher risks than he would if the situation were real.
In this general connection the extent of role involvement might
be experimented with, drawing out and reintroducing the "control rods,"
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as it were, to keep the role-playing effect alive but still being able
to consult and discuss out of role as appropriate. It should be re-
membered that, unlike student games in which role-playing may produce
the desired pedagogic result, the professional games aim to produce
insights into courses of foreign policy action that the United States
might one day face. Role-playing here is strictly a means to an end,
not an end in itself. The game might even be stopped after each move
and the decisions analysed before going on. Alternatively play might
end when one side had identified all the alternatives open to it at a
given choice-point without waiting to see "how it came out." Or it
might be decided to stop and replay a given move with different strat-
egies, if that seemed a more productive course.
One unresearched phenomenon observed in the previous Center
student and professional games--and common to all of them--has been
the high degree of consensus among team members that their team had
"won" or had "come out better" than their adversary or an opposing
coalition. A tendency to euphoria permeated many teams as they began
to play out their initial strategy, remained despite setbacks, and even
persisted into the post-game Plenary Critique Sessions when the teams'
assessments of outcomes were made explicit.
This unanticipated situation was as striking as it was consistent.
Although each game realistically yielded a clear non-zero-sum outcome,
it was almost as if some participants perceived themselves in zero-
sum situations. This was so even though the generally held concept of
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international relations on the part of participants was that one side's
gain is not necessarily another's loss, or, put differently, both may
win, or both may lose. Although this point also should be a commonly
recognized inference from non-zero-sum game theory, it does not appear
to be generally applied in the literature on international relations,
arms control, or deterrence strategy.9
We would suggest one simple hypothesis to explain this phenom-
enon: that the game world does mirror the real world insofar as the
goals and strategic policies of opposing groups usually overlap to
some extent. In those areas where goals and policies of antagonistic
parties are not mutually exclusive, leaders of both groups are
rationally entitled to observe progress and claim success. However,
they cannot logically claim that such progress is gained at their
opponent's expense. This later claim is logical only in situations
where adversaries are competing for mutually exclusive objectives.
Yet in the games, as in life, governments often enter such illogical
9This point tends to be by-passed by writers on deterrence
strategy through stress on competitive strategies. See, for
example, Thomas W. Milburn, "The Concept of Deterrence: Some
Logical and Psychological Considerations," Journal of Social
Issues, v.17, no.3 (1961), p.4.
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claims. But when is such illogical behavior also rational (as it
can be when actual defeat is either claimed as victory for propaganda
reasons or misinterpreted as victory because of false information) and
when is it irrational (as it is when the decision-maker comes to
believe his own myths)?
This faulty assessment of relative outcomes arose only because
the game design permitted- -indeed required- -individual teamts to define
their own goals, strategies and contingency plans in light of the crisis
specified by the scenario. The teams defined these in ways which did,
in fact, provide room for considerabIe naneuvre. To have followed the
usual practice of most traditional military and some game-theoretic
games where competitive goals or utilities or payoffs are specified in
advance would have suppressed the unexpected consequences.
Another area of research interest relates to the several sources
of the misperception of messages received by the teams in games ob-
served to date. First and probably most important, the teams--partic-
ularly the U.S. and Soviet--have each tended to make a premature
assessment from the other's initial messages of their goals, strategies,
1 0 Similarly, even persons playing in non-zero-sum laboratory games
often adopt zero-sum strategies rather than reach the mutually profit-
able bargains which are there for the taking. The need for further re-
search on this point is expressed by Richard C. Snyder and James A.
Robinson, National and International Decision-Making: Toward a General
Research Strategy Related to the Problem of War and Peace (New York:
Institute for International~Order, n.d. /c.1_7_p.164. They suggest
that decision-makers may "define the structure of decision-making
situations differently from the way theorists do."
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and contingency plans, and then have adhered to this false reading
despite further inputs of contradictory signals from both the other
teams and Control. This perhaps results from human tendencies to
optimism, to denial of the unpleasant, and, in a more precise opera-
tional sense, to blocking out relevant information in a mounting crisis
11
situation. This particular type of misperception is closely related
to the faulty assessments of wins and losses discussed above, and
probably closely simulates international crisis management.
A second source of misperception of communications can be attri-
buted directly to the artificial aspects of the game. For example,
the compressed time period of the crises and small size of teams seems
to result in a less-than-realistic volume and variety of relevant
information and staff evaluations reaching the top policy-making
echelon within teams.
A third source of misperception of messages can be attributed to
administrative errors. These resulted either from faulty messages
that were constructed in haste or from the failure of control to be
llAs Milburn, loc. cit., states: "There is evidence that periods
of heightened tension or crises, lead to (and have led to) a simplifi-
cation of cognitive structure, to a reduction in the number of goals
and the number of perceived alternatives, as well as to frustration-
produced aggression." For an empirical study demonstrating the impact
on cognitive structures of various intensities of crisis in the inter-
nation simulations at Northwestern University see Michael J. Driver,
Conceptual Structure and Group Processes in an Inter-Nation Simulation,
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University and Educational Testing Seryice,
1962.
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responsive to all requests or needs on the part of the teams for follow-
on intelligence. Fortunately, these types of misdirection seemed to
have produced only insignificant alterations in the course of the games
played so far.12 Another type of confused communication occurred dur-
ing the last game in the series when the Soviet team was misled into
believing the U.N. team to have allied itself with the U.S. team in
an operation that could only disadvantage Soviet interests. This
resulted from the policy of Control in this game of withholding from
the Soviet team certain key U.N. messages and substituting summarized
versions which inadvertently altered the message intent. All of these
administrative errors should be readily eliminated in the future by a
combination of additional pre-game briefing of both Control and the team
Rapporteurs, as well as more explicit provisions for making a member of
Control responsible for preserving the continuity .of secondary threads
of events.
Another promising area for research involves the possible effects
on game outcomes of varying the quality and experience of the per-
sons selected to play. For example, it might prove friuitful to use
non-Americans in teams to avoid the possibly signifidant predisposi-
tions of culture-bound Americans.1 3 It would be interesting to
1 2This was confirmed independently by the participants, the Game
Historian's summary, and the systems analysis by Professor Cushen.
1 3 Snyder and Robinson, op. cit., have similarly emphasized the
need for such cross-cultural research in international decision-
making.
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observe foreign officials "role-play" the strategy of their nation.
Similarly, it would be instructive to interchange roles--Russians
on a U.S. team playing opposite Americans on a Soviet team--to explore
the efficacy of this technique for teaching mutual perceptions of the
constraints that operate on one's adversary.
All these phenomena deserve high priority in further research.
Although the richness of uncontrolled variables characteristic of this
particular gaming technique does not allow definitive identification
or control of all of them, it should be possible to generate promising
hypotheses about some which could then be tested by the laboratory-
type small-group experiments which are expected to be an adjunct to the
next series of games.
VI. Conclusion
How then can we sum up? The art of the political exercise is
in its infancy, but it is a modestly promising infant. While it is
not a magic shortcut to knowledge of the. future, neither is it purely
social science fiction. It can be very expensive in time, manpower,
and money to organize on any substantial scale; but it can also be
done for virtually nothing, requiring only willing--and able--partici-
pants. In a time when nations--and individuals--are communicating more
but understanding the messages less, it can be only helpful to get a
glimpse of ourselves as others see us, or of others as they may see
themselves.
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It is quite clear from the POLEX-DAIS games, as well as seminar
experiments, that this gaming technique can be applied with special
benefit to the field of disarmament and arms control. Gaming is partic-
ularly relevant there because agreements about limiting armaments, if
they take place, will occur in an environment that by definition
differs from the one we now live in. The game technique is a particu-
larly good way to move people from the present to a different political
or arms environment, setting a hypothetical situation and requiring
them to act in ways consistent with it. This could yield important
values in our understanding of how to plan ahead.
It was suggested earlier that possibly the most crucial feature
of this enterprise is the way it requires the players to live with the
implications of their chosen strategy. For compared with what happens
in a planning operation around a table, or in the brain of a single
individual, however gifted, the game sets up a process that by its
nature produces a dynamic sequence of actions and responses and counter-
actions. This sequential process proceeds under a momentum of its own
once it is set in motion, and can go in quite logical and plausible
directions not always foreseen. A kind of dynamic chain reaction takes
place well beyond the capacity of a single mind to anticipate. The
reason for this takes us back to the role-playing itself, for the heart
of this process is the interaction of antagonistic wills; .the same
effect can be produced solo only by a schizophrenic.
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For all of these reasons, the political-military exercise may
be rated as excellent for training, useful for teaching and potentially
valuable--within limits that have been only tentatively probed--
for policy research and planning.
